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Cooperation: Toward a Revision 
of the Concept and its Application 
Charles E. Curran, S.J. 
Questions of cooperation arise 
when a person - either an indi-
vidual person or a moral person 
- works together with another 
in producing a particular action. 
Ethical problems result when the 
person is asked to cooperate in 
Father Curran's discussion re-
volves around the limitations im-
posed on the individual's freedom 
to act according to the dictates 
of his conscience. He directs his 
attention primarily to the ques-
tions of sterilization, abortion and 
the cooperating physician. 
Father Curran is a professor of 
M oral Theology at the Catholic 
University of America. 
an act which he believes to be 
wrong. Such problems will fre-
quently occur in a pluralistic so-
ciety where there are conflicting 
ethical beliefs. 
Cooperation has been an im-
portant topic in Catholic moral 
theology especially in the twen-
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tieth century. To illustrate this 
point one can readily find in the 
literature of moral theology many 
references to questions involving 
cooperation. Journals published 
for priests in all languages gen-
erally contained a section in 
which a moral theologian respond-
ed to ethical problems and ques-
tions, and problems of cooperation 
were frequently discussed. For 
example, John McCarthy in the 
1950's published two volumes be-
longing to the genre of responses 
to cases of conscience.! These re-
sponses had originally been pub-
lished by him for the guidance of 
priests and confessors in the Irish 
Ecclesiastical Record in the fif-
teen year period before their pub-
lication in book form. 
On at least ten different occa-
sions in these volumes McCarthy 
responds to questions involving 
problems of cooperation in vari-
ous areas - cooperating in giving 
a Protestant minister bread and 
wine for a communion service; 
financial support for the building 
of Protestant churches; cooperat-
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mg in the OxfO'rd GrO'up m0've-
ment; abO'rti0'n; c0'0'perati0'n 0'f a 
landlady in the acts 0'f her ten-
ants; c0'O'perati0'n 0'f a w0'rker 
with an empl0'yer wh0' asks him t0' 
cheat; restituti0'n coming fr0'm 
c00'perati0'n; a SP0'use c0'0'perating 
with the use 0'f artificial C0'ntra-
ception; a lawyer and his client; 
a dO'ct0'r and his patient. 2 
Medical ethics 0'bvi0'usly fur-
nishes many questi0'ns 0'f c0'0'pera-
ti0'n. The Catholic textb0'0'ks in 
medical ethics invariably outline 
the accepted teaching within the 
Cath0'lic Church 0'n c0'operation, 
0'ften in the context of general 
principles which will then be ap-
plied t0' the specific questi0'ns 0'f 
medical ethics. Edwin Healy, f0'r 
example, devotes more than ten 
pages t0' the discussiO'n 0'f C0'0'per-
ati0'n and treats such practical 
cases as illicit 0'perati0'ns, abor-
ti0'n, contracepti0'n, sterilizati0'n, 
medical partnership, summ0'ning 
a non-Catholic clergyman f0'r a 
dying patient, calling attenti0'n 
t0' mistakes in surgery.3 Questi0'ns 
0'f this type are O'bviously still 
arising at the present time. 
In the m0're recent periodical 
literature 0'n the American scene 
there is great emphasis today 0'n 
the role 0'f Catholic h0'spitals. 
Catholic h0'spitals adhere t0' the 
Ethical and Religious Directives 
for Catholic Health Facilities pr0'-
P0'sed by the American bish0'Ps in 
their present f0'rm in 1971.4 Many 
people in society in general and 
sO'me within the R0'man Cath0'lic 
Church d0' not agree with all the 
teachings c0'ntained in these di-
rectives. ; Legal cases have been 
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brought against Cath0'lic h0's-
pitals to perform sterilizati0'ns. 
Some fear that Cath0'lic h0'spitals 
may be faced with C0'urt 0'rders 
t0' perf0'rm O'ther types 0'f now f0'r-
bidden 0'perati0'ns including abor-
tions. While there is a feeling 
am0'ng a few that Catholic h0's-
pitals will not be able t0' c0'ntinue 
to exist in this country in the 
future if they adhere t0' their 
ethical code, others maintain 
there is a legal and c0'nstitutional 
right for Catholic h0'spitals t0' 
c0'ntinue t0' exist and t0' act in 
acc0'rd with their stated religi0'us 
code of ethics.6 
Pr0'blems involving the Cath0'-
lic hospital are very c0'mplex, 
since they involve matters O'f fed-
eral funding and the rights 0'f 
non-Catholics. Much 0'f the dis-
cussion has been in terms 0'f the 
legal aspects 0'f the questi0'n, but 
it is imp0'rtant to' rec0'gnize the 
moral and ethical aspects. This 
present paper cann0't attempt to 
s0'lve definitively these very com-
plicated issues, but it will try t0' 
clarify the understanding 0'f C0'-
operati0'n and thus pr0'vide indi-
cati0'ns f0'r soluti0'ns to these 
questiO'ns. 
The Teaching of The Manuals 
on C00'perati0'n 
The teaching of the manuals 0'f 
m0'ral theol0'gy and 0'f medical 
ethics 0'n cooperati0'n f0'llows the 
same pattern and C0'mes t0' the 
same general c0'nclusions alth0'ugh 
there is 0'ccasi0'nally different ter-
min0'I0'gy. C0'0'perati0'n is 0'ften 
defined as the concurrence with 
an0'ther person in an act which is 
m0'rally wr0'ng. Cooperation may 
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be either positive or negative, but 
the more important distinction 
exists between formal and mate-
rial cooperation. Formal coopera-
tion, by which the cooperator con-
sents to the sin or the bad will of 
the principal actor (either explicit-
ly by intending the sin or im-
plicitly by immediate cooperation 
in an action which is intrinsically 
wrong), is always wrong. Some au-
thors, e.g., Merkelbach, describe 
the second type of cooperation as 
immediate material cooperation 
because one does not explicitly 
join his will with the evil will of 
the principal actor, but such co-
operation is nonetheless always 
wrong.8 Material cooperation, 
since it helps one perform an evil 
action but does not involve con-
currence with the bad will, is 
wrong but can be justified if pro-
portionate reasons exist with 
more serious reasons required 
when the cooperation is more in-
volved in the act of the principal 
agent. 
Catholic ethicists developed a 
casuistry to indicate how prud-
ence should decide different cases 
of material cooperation.9 Remote 
and nonnecessary cooperation can 
be justified by a slight reason; for 
example, an ordeply can work for 
a hospital in which abortions are 
performed merely because of the 
salary he receives. Remote, neces-
sary or proximate, nonnecessary 
cooperation can be justified for a 
grave reason, whereas proximate, 
necessary cooperation can be jus-
tified only for a notably grave 
reason. Thus a doctor may serve 
154 
as a first assistant at an illicit 
operation if he fears that other-
wise he might lose his position 
provided that he not do the actual 
illicit operation itself. Catholic 
nurses, whose cooperation is 
somewhat less proximate, may as-
sist at illicit operations in a state 
institution even though they 
could find employment elsewhere 
because they can do much good 
in these institutions and thus 
compensate for the occasional and 
unavoidably material cooperation 
in evil. 10 Proximate, necessary 
cooperation in an act which harms 
a third person can be justified 
only to avoid a similar or slightly 
less evil to one's self. Thus a 
pharmacist may give poison to a 
man who is going to kill his wife 
if the man threatens the phar-
macist with a gun if he refuses to 
cooperate. Cooperation which is 
proximately necessary for a grave 
public evil cannot be justified by 
any private advantage. 
The general teaching on co-
operation as well as the rules of 
prudence are proposed in just 
about the same way by all the 
authors of textbooks. The manu-
als of moral theology which gen-
erally follow the pattern of the 
ten commandments in their struc-
ture (especially those of the J es-
uit and Redemptorist schools) 
treat cooperation as one of the 
sins against charity. Cooperation 
is thus closely associated with 
scandal, another sin against char-
ity, which is defined as any deed 
or word which is sinful or seem-
ingly sinful and affords another 
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the occasion of spiritual ruin. 1 1 
Benedict Merkelbach and other 
authors following the Dominican 
tradition consider cooperation un-
der external causes of sin, where-
as scandal is discussed under the 
virtue of charity.1 2 However these 
are comparatively minor ques-
tions of structure and do not af-
fect the general agreement found 
among all authors. 
History of The Concept 
Although there is general agree-
ment on the meaning and rules 
affecting cooperation, this teach-
ing as it exists in the manuals 
does not go back to the explicit 
teaching of Thomas Aquinas. 
Aquinas does not make the dis-
tinction between material and 
formal cooperation with the re-
spective definitions as found in 
the manuals. In one place in the 
Summa Theologiae Thomas dis-
cusses cooperation in the context 
of restitution. Here Aquinas ac-
cepts the traditionally enumerat-
ed ways in which one can cooper-
ate in the act of another. The 
Angelic Doctor maintains that in 
five cases the one who helps in 
the act of another is held to res-
titution although the primary ob-
ligation of restitution rests with 
the primary cause of the act (II-
II, q.62, a.2). In another context 
Aquinas accepts the fact that the 
artisan commits a sin in making 
things such as idols which cannot 
be used by others without sin 
(II-II, q.169, a .2, ad.4). 
Thomas Sanchez, one of the 
most important figures in the his-
tory of moral theology who died 
at the beginning of the 17th cen-
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tury, considers cooperation as a 
particular case of scandal but 
does raise questions about cooper-
ating with acts that are indif-
ferent and with acts that are 
intrinsically wrong. Although San-
chez talks about intrinsically 
wrong actions, there is ambiguity 
about whether his terminology re-
fers to acts understood in their 
essence or acts which are intrin-
sically wrong in the concrete cir-
cumstances. It was up to later 
theologians to differentiate theo-
retically in a more accurate man-
ner between cooperation and 
scandal and also to introduce the 
accepted terminology of material 
and formal cooperation.13 
The seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries in Catholic moral the-
ology witnessed a struggle be-
tween laxists and rigorists which 
was marked by papal intervention 
condemning extremes on both 
sides. 14 In 1679, sixty five propo-
sitions were condemned by the 
Holy Office, many of which had 
originally been proposed for con-
demnation at the University of 
Louvain. Li One condemned propo-
sition stated that a servant who 
knowingly helped his master to 
climb through a window to ravish 
a virgin does not sin mortally if 
he does it through fear of great 
harm or loss. 16 Subsequently the-
ologians debated about the exact 
meaning of this condemnation 
and the reason for it. Is this act 
condemned because it is intrin-
sically wrong in all circumstances 
or is it condemned because there 
is not a sufficient reason to jus-
tify it in this case? Before St. 
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Alphonsus the vast majority of 
theologians held the former op-
inion, but some few did maintain 
the latterY St. Alphonsus Li-
guori, the outstanding moral the-
ologian of the eighteenth century, 
who was later declared a doctor 
of the Church and patron of mor-
al theologians and confessors, in 
the first edition of his moral the-
ology (which was basically a 
commentary on the text of Her-
man Busembaum) proposed the 
opinion that such acts were in-
trinsically wrong. 18 
In subsequent editions of his 
moral theology, however, Alphon-
sus adopted the second opinion. 
Such a development set the stage 
for a discussion of the meaning 
of an intrinsically wrong act and 
for pointing out the differences 
between material and formal co-
operation. Alphonsus argues that 
the acts of the servant are not 
intrinsically wrong so the cooper-
ation is only material. But the 
crime of ravaging a virgin is so 
monstrous that only a reason of 
extreme necessity such as a fear 
of death could excuse and justify 
the cooperation. In his theoreti-
cal exposition Alphonsus distin-
guishes between formal and mate-
rial cooperation, describing the 
formal as concurring with the bad 
will of the other which is always 
wrong. Material cooperation, on 
the other hand, concurs only to 
the bad action of the other. For-
mal cooperation always involves 
an influence on the will of the 
principal agent, but this can take 
place in a twofold manner - by 
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intending the evil or by cooperat-
ing immediately in an act whic;:h 
is intrinsically wrong and thus 
influencing the will of the other. 
In material cooperation the act 
itself cannot be intrinsically 
wrong but must be good or in-
different. 19 
Alphonsus thus presents the 
framework within which coopera-
tion has been discussed in Roman 
Catholic theology to the present 
time. The only theoretical point 
of difference in the contemporary 
discussions, as pointed out above, 
concerns whether or not coopera-
tion in an intrinsically wrong act 
is formal cooperation or imme-
diate material cooperation. In 
practice, however, there is no dif-
ference because no author would 
justify cooperation in such a 
case despite the difference in 
theoretical understandings. It is 
precisely this question of cooper-
ation with an act which is in-
trinsically wrong which has been 
frequently emphasized in the Ro-
man Catholic teachings on co-
operation with non-Catholic wor-
ship services, the publishing of 
immoral books, cooperation in 
onanism or cooperation in medi-
cal operations which are judged 
to be intrinsically wrong. 
In my judgment there is an ele-
ment missing in the accepted un-
derstanding of cooperation, and 
the inclusion of this element calls 
for theoretical and practical 
changes in this teaching. The 
missing aspect refers to the sub-
jectivity and rights of conscience 
of the person who is acting. The 
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older definitions assume that one 
concurs with either the bad will 
or the bad act of the principal 
actor. But the important thing is 
to realize that one is cooperating 
with a person and not just with 
an act or a will. Thus one must 
consider the rights of the person 
in this case and not merely the 
factor of a bad will or a bad act 
although these do remain impor-
tant considerations but not the 
only ones. A comparison with the 
newer teaching on religious lib-
erty in the Roman Catholic 
Church should indicate why one 
must begin to see cooperation also 
in terms of the person and not 
just in terms of the will or the 
act. 
The Teaching On 
Religious Freedom 
The older approach within Ro-
man Catholic theology denied re-
ligious liberty in the name of ob-
jective truth. The Roman Catho-
lic Church sees itself as the one, 
true Church of Jesus Christ and 
all persons, as well as the state, 
have an obligation to accept that 
truth. To the plea that there 
should be freedom of conscience 
in this matter so that people can 
worship God according to the dic-
tates of their own conscience, the 
reply was frequently given that 
error has no rights. In practice 
for prudential reasons of avoiding 
even greater problems, however, 
one could tolerate the separation 
of church and state and the exist-
ence of religious liberty in the 
state.2Q 
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The Declaration on Religious 
Freedom of Vatican II begins by 
recognizing that the dignity of 
the human person has been im-
pressing itself more deeply on 
contemporary human conscious-
ness with the resulting demand 
that men should act more and 
more on their own judgment in 
responsible freedom and not driv-
en by coercion. Today there is a 
great demand for freedom in hu-
man society especially in those 
things pertaining to the human 
spirit and the free exercise of re-
ligion. 2 l 
There are three aspects of the 
teaching of this document that 
are of particular importance for 
our present considerations. First, 
the document very early defines 
the meaning of religious liberty 
and how it fits in with the self-
understanding of the Roman 
Catholic Church. The final and 
approved text very quickly as-
serts that the one, true religion 
subsists in the Roman Catholic 
Church and all men are bound to 
seek the truth. Religious liberty 
based on the dignity of the hu-
man person involves immunity 
from external coercion so that no 
one is forced to act contrary to 
his beliefs, nor is anyone to be 
restrained from acting in accord 
with his religious beliefs. This 
right inheres in the dignity of the 
person and therefore continues 
to exist even in those who do not 
live up to their obligation of seek-
ing the truth and adhering to it. 
Religious liberty does not mean 
that the individual person does 
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not have the obligation to seek 
the truth as revealed to us by 
God in Jesus Christ.22 
Secondly, the document wisely 
does not solve a problem that was 
and continues to be debated 
among Catholic thinkers - the 
theoretical basis for religious lib-
erty. The document bases relig-
ious freedom on the dignity of the 
human person as this is known 
through human reason and revel-
ation, but it prudently does not 
attempt to give anyone theoreti-
cal reason and mentions a num-
ber of arguments that were 
proposed at that time - the right 
and duty to follow conscience 
which was included in the final 
document in a subsidiary and not 
in the central place; the dignity 
of the human person and the con-
stitutional principle of the limita-
tion of the state in matters of re-
ligion, which through the efforts 
especially of John Courtney Mur-
ray had become central in the 
third and fourth texts of the dec-
laration, was mentioned in the 
final document but does not re-
ceive primacy; 2.l the argument 
from freedom based on a scrip-
tural approach is also included: 
the argument from the right and 
duty to seek the truth has pri-
mary place in the final document 
both in terms of position and in 
terms of the number of lines de-
voted to it, but the other reasons 
given above are also mentioned. 2~ 
This indicates there is still quite 
a bit of work to do in trying to 
discover the exact theoretical ba-
sis for the teaching on religious 
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liberty although all are agreed 
that the teaching rests on the dig-
nity of the human person as 
known through faith and reason 
even though the precise form of 
its justification remains open to 
discussion. 
A third important question 
concerns the limits on religious 
freedom. Obviously in any society 
the rights of some people might 
conflict with the rights of others 
or society itself. The document 
rightly sees the primary limita-
tion in terms of the personal and 
social responsibility of the in-
dividual. The rights of others as 
well as our duties toward them 
must be respected. In addition, 
society itself has the duty to de-
fend itself, but government in-
terference cannot be arbitrary and 
must be in conformity with the 
objective moral order. The Dec-
lara tion sees the justification of 
interference by the state in terms 
of the criterion of the public 
order.2; 
The question of the limitation 
of the right to religious liberty de-
veloped in the course of the dis-
cussions and of the drafts before 
the final document was approved. 
The first criterion proposed in 
the historical evolution of the 
text was the common good, but it 
was felt that this term was too 
broad and open to possible ar-
bitrariness and abuse. The cri-
terion of the objective end of so-
ciety was proposed and rejected 
for the same reasons. The term 
public order, which is frequently 
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used in the constitutions of many 
modern states and which bears 
some similarity to the concept of 
penal laws of the state employed 
as a criterion in a similar case by 
Pope Pius XII, was finally adopt-
ed. 26 Public order is that funda-
mental part of the common good 
which is confided to the political 
authorities.27 To overcome the 
fear of some that the concept of 
public order was too limiting in 
its understanding of the role of 
the state especially in matters of 
social justice, the second intro-
ductory report of the textus re-
emendatus (the fourth schemaF~ 
emphasized that the concept of 
public order was applied to ques-
tions of religious freedom and did 
not concern matters of social jus-
tice and the way the state should 
act in achieving such justice. 
According to the final docu-
ment public order embraces three 
essential elements - to safeguard 
the rights of citizens (an order 
of justice), to maintain the public 
peace and to protect public mo-
rality. 29 It should be noted that 
the public morality here referred 
to is not an agreement on all mat-
ters of morality but those mini-
mal standards of public morality 
which are required for human be-
ings to live together in society. 3D 
Thus an objective criterion is de-
termined for the state's right to 
interfere in the religious liberty of 
its subjects. For example, the 
state thus could prohibit the use 
of human sacrifice in a particular 
religion because this goes against 
the order of justice which re-
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quires the safeguarding of the 
right to life of all citizens. In the 
light of this criterion one must 
consider the action of the state 
concerning polygamy or blood 
transfusions for children of Je-
hovah's Witnesses. 
A Revised Understanding 
of Cooperation 
The teaching on religious liber-
ty has both similarities and dis-
similarities with the question of 
cooperation. First it is important 
to point out the dissimilarities. 
Cooperation refers to the fact 
that the individual positively con-
curs in the act of the principal 
agent. In the case of religious lib-
erty there is no concurrence with 
the act of the other person but 
rather there is the recognition 
that society has to allow the per-
son to perform those acts based 
on his religious beliefs. Also re-
ligious liberty concerns the rela-
tionship of the government to the 
individual and not the relation-
ship of one individual to another. 
In addition, religious liberty is 
not exactly the same as all other 
kinds of liberty. Since religious 
freedom refers to matters of such 
great importance, it can be some-
what differentiated from other 
types of freedom. 
The argument for a changed 
understanding of cooperation does 
not rest on an exact parallel with 
the question of religious liberty. 
However, the analogy with relig-
ious liberty is used to indicate 
that in both cases the dignity of 
the human person and the rights 
of the human person to act with 
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responsible freedom must be tak-
en into account. The older ap-
proach denying religious liberty 
emphasized the concept of objec-
tive truth rather than the dignity 
of the person. Roman Catholic 
moral theology in general has 
rightly been critized for the fact 
that its moral teaching in the last 
few centuries has given so much 
emphasis to the objective and 
even the physical that it has not 
given enough importance to sub-
jectivity and freedom. The newer 
approach to religious liberty rec-
ognizes this fact and indicates a 
dimension that had not hereto-
fore been considered. In the case 
of cooperation it seems that one 
must also consider the right of 
the individual person to act in 
accord with one's own decision of 
conscience. 
The older approach to coopera-
tion understood the action of the 
cooperator as concurring with the 
will or the act of the other person. 
If the will was bad or if the act 
was bad, then there was either 
formal or material cooperation. 
But is it adequate to describe the 
action merely as cooperating with 
a bad will or a bad action? This 
could be a partial explanation, 
but a more adequ~te description 
understands cooperation as con-
curring not primarily with a will 
or with an act but with a person. 
The person, however, may have a 
bad will (e.g., a criminal planning 
a robbery) or may do a bad act 
(write a knowingly false article). 
The point is that the full under-
standing of cooperation must take 
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account of the dignity of the oth-
er person and that person's right 
to act in accord with his own re-
sponsible freedom. Nevertheless, 
one cannot ignore the elements of 
a bad will or a bad act which have 
been part of the consideration in 
the past. 
There is another factor which 
should also change somewhat the 
traditional teaching on coopera-
tion. As mentioned, one of the 
most important parts of the Ro-
man Catholic teaching has been 
the fact that one cannot cooper-
ate with an action which is in-
trinsically wrong. However, there 
is much dispute today even with-
in Roman Catholic theology 
about the whole question of 
what, if anything, is intrinsically 
wrong. 3 1 
At the very minimum, we are 
often dealing with cases in which 
the individual person does not be-
lieve that his or her action is in 
any way wrong although I might 
believe it is wrong. In these cases 
even in accord with the older un-
derstanding it is impossible to 
speak about the bad will of the 
primary agent. The older Catho-
lic theology recognized that there 
could be invincible ignorance in 
these cases. There can be no for-
mal cooperation when the individ-
ual involved does not have a bad 
will. There are two other factors 
that must be mentioned. Above 
all, there is the right of the co-
operator to act in accord with his 
conscience so that he cannot be 
forced to do something he be-
lieves is wrong. Also there are 
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limits on the rights of the prin-
cipal agent which in my judgment 
are similar to the limits placed on 
religious freedom and governed 
by the criterion of public order 
with its threefold content of an 
order of justice, an order of peace 
and an order of common mo-
rality. 
The Doctor 
How does this understanding 
of cooperation work in practice? 
Take as example the doctor who 
believes in his own conscience 
that sterilization is wrong when 
done for contraceptive purposes 
but has a patient who believes it 
is morally and medically good.32 
Here is a conflict of rights - the 
rights of both to follow their own 
conscience. In normal circum-
stances one can readily uphold 
the right of both persons to act in 
accord with their own conscience. 
The doctor in conscience can re-
fuse to do what he believes to be 
wrong, and the patient can find 
another doctor to perform the op-
eration. Obviously society profits 
very much if we respect the free-
dom of individuals in these mat-
ters. Moral integrity certainly 
calls for people to act in accord 
with their conscience, and the 
neutral outsider can applaud the 
actions of both. 
Could the doctor come to a dif-
ferent conclusion? In the past the 
traditional approach of Roman 
Catholic theology would not allow 
the doctor to come to another an-
swer because the act is intrinsical-
ly wrong. However, the doctor 
can do such an operation without 
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cooperating with the bad will of 
the patient because the patient 
has no bad will in this case. The 
doctor could argue that although 
he thinks the action is wrong the 
patient has the right to obtain 
the needed medical care that one 
needs and wants. In this society 
we daily live with people who do 
things we believe are wrong. 
Without unduly sacrificing his 
own conscientious principles, the 
doctor could argue that in this 
case he is providing the service 
for which this individual person 
has a right even though he him-
self disagrees with the operation 
from a moral perspective. The 
doctor by his action is not saying 
that this particular operation is 
right but he is saying that the 
person has the right to this par-
ticular operation even if the doc-
tor is opposed to it on moral 
grounds. 
Does not such a solution open 
the door to justifying any type 
of cooperation? No. There are 
limits on the cooperation as pro-
posed in the criterion of public 
order. One should not cooperate 
with another if this harms the 
public order - the rights of oth-
er innocent persons, the peace 
and common morality of society. 
Thus one could not immediately 
cooperate in lying or stealing 
which are opposed to the common 
morality necessary for public or-
der. 
The above argumentation in no 
way implies that the doctor is 
just a conduit or robot who has 
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no freedom in this matter. There 
is no doubt that in this case the 
doctor is an immediate coopera-
tor, and he could refuse such co-
operation because of his own 
conscience claims. But by accept-
ing the fact of a pluralistic society 
and the rights of the other per-
son he could in good conscience 
perform the sterilization for some-
one who believes it is medically 
and morally indicated. 
Could the doctor perform an 
abortion in similar circumstances? 
The patient believes there is noth-
ing wrong with such an abortion 
in this particular case, but the 
doctor believes it is the immoral 
killing of an innocent human be-
ing. There remains a great dif-
ference between this and the case 
of sterilization, for here harm is 
done to a third, innocent party. 
If the doctor truly believes abor-
tion to be the killing of innocent 
persons, I do not see how he could 
ever perform such an operation 
except in the most extreme cases. 
One cannot immediately cooper-
ate with another person to act in 
accord with this person's con-
scientious decision if such an ac-
tion is going to cause dispropor-
tionate harm to another person 
or to society. Thus ··in this ques-
tion the limits of cooperation, 
which are somewhat similar to 
the limits proposed in the case of 
religious liberty, become deter-
minative. In this case it is not 
simply the right of the doctor and 
the right of the patient but also 
the right of the innocent third 
party (at least according to the 
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doctor's belief) that must be tak-
en into consideration. 
Catholic Hospitals 
What about the case of Catho-
lic hospitals today? Recent dis-
cussions of this question have 
concentrated on the legal per-
spective. Court cases have been 
brought against Catholic hos-
pitals to make them perform op-
erations which they believe are 
illicit, but as of early 1974 there 
has been no final decision order-
ing a Catholic hospital to perform 
a sterilization. 11 In the case of ab-
ortion the Supreme Court in the 
Georgia case upheld the constitu-
tionality of a conscience clause 
permitting exemptions both for 
personnel and hospitals from per-
forming abortions if it was against 
their conscientious beliefs. 34 
From the legal perspective one 
can argue that the situation of 
the Catholic hospital is now 
changed because often it is a hos-
pital serving the total community 
and because it receives much 
money from government sources 
in terms of Hill-Burton funds, 
exemptions from personal income 
and property taxes, and tax dol-
lars in Medicare and Medicaid. 
Therefore the state has the right 
to make sure all citizens can be 
served in these hospitals and 
can have operations which are 
medically indicated even though 
against the moral code of the 
sponsoring agent of the hospital. 
The opposite side argues that the 
right to practice religion in the 
dispensation of health care is a 
constitutional right protected by 
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the First Amendment. If t he cor-
porate by-laws of Catholic hos-
pitals show their adherence to a 
moral code, these rights to prac-
tice in this way must be upheld 
by society.3; 
The discussion in this article 
will consider only the moral as-
pects of the problem although 
t hese a re quite intertwined with 
some of the legal aspects. No one 
can deny the right of the Catho-
lic hospital to exist and to follow 
its own moral code. Does t he fact 
that they serve a total communi-
ty and receive government funds 
do away with this right? Here 
again there is a collision of rights 
- the right of the Catholi c hos-
pital to exist and put into prac-
tice its own moral teaching and 
the right of all citi zens to have 
the medical care and treatment 
deemed appropriate. There is no 
doubt that in many situations in 
la rge metropolitan centers both 
rights can be guaranteed without 
harm to others. Collisions could 
arise and will a ri se where the 
Catholic fa cility is t he only one 
serving a particular area. Here a 
possible conflict a rises . 
One could make a case for the 
Catholic hospital 's right to live 
by its moral code even in the 
midst of our pluralistic society. I 
would urge a more nuanced ap-
proach to the question and dis-
tinguish again between the cases 
of sterilization and of abortion . 
The Catholic hospital could main -
tain its own prescribed teaching 
on sterilization and still recognize 
t he righ ts of ot her people to act 
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in accord with their own personal 
decision. Since no innocen t per-
sons would be hurt by such a pro-
cedure a nd since t he society as 
such would not be hurt, I see no 
reason why Catholic hospitals 
could not in good moral consci-
ence make the decision to a llow 
people t o have sterilizations in 
Catholic hospitals. The coopera-
tion of the hospital is less proxi-
mate than t hat of the doctor do-
ing t he sterilization . Once again 
in t his case one can argue that 
t he Catholic hospita l in no way 
approves t he particular action 
taken but acknowledges t he righ t 
of the individual t o act in accord 
with conscience provided that the 
rights of other innocent persons 
and of society a re not harmed. 
There are other considerations 
which also argue in favor of t his 
position. Above all , one must rec-
ognize the fact that wi thin Ro-
man Catholicism today there is 
much dissent on the question of 
steri lization. Many Roman Cath-
olic theologians and people be-
lieve there is nothing morally 
wrong with contraceptive sterili-
zation in many ci rcumstances. -le, 
In theory one must admit the 
possibility of dissent in the ques-
tion of contraceptive sterilization. 
Is it possible then for the Church 
to operate Catholic hospitals in 
which Catholics are not able to 
exercise their right to dissent? 
This intra-Catholic disagreement 
at the present time is an even 
stron ger reason for allowing steri-
lizations in Catholic hospials. 
Some of the arguments pro-
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posed by Catholics to sustain 
their moral and legal right to op-
erate hospitals according to their 
ethical code properly point out 
that other religious groups within 
society are also striving to main-
tain their rights to act in accord-
ance with their own principles. 
For example, mention is frequent-
ly made of the practice of the 
Mennonites and Amish with re-
gard to education. I applaud the 
defense of the religious freedom 
of these groups, but there are dif-
ferences. The problem concerns 
the non-Catholic in C'ltholic hos-
pitals and the freedom of that 
person. There is also an impor-
tant ecclesiological difference be-
tween Roman Catholisism and 
many forms of sectarian Chris-
tianity. Roman Catholicism as a 
Church has opted for a stance of 
cooperation with the world even 
though it recognizes at times it 
should and must disagree with 
what is happening in the world. 
On the other hand the sectarian 
groups in Christianity have gen-
erally based their beliefs on a 
withdrawal from the world and 
the recognition of an inherent in-
compatibility between the world 
and the gospel message. Thus, 
from an ecclesiological viewpoint 
one cannot make a perfect identi-
ty between the sects who wish to 
follow their own teaching and the 
Catholic Church which by defini-
tion has always been much more 
open to cooperation with the 
world. 
What about abortion? Just as 
in the case of the individual doc-
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tor so too in the case of the hos-
pital there is an important new 
element in this case. Present 
Catholic teaching believes that 
one much act as if human life is 
present from the very beginning 
of conception. Therefore abortion 
is looked upon as the killing of 
innocent human life. One could 
argue very strongly in this case 
that the Catholic hospitals should 
never cooperate with abortion be-
cause to do so would bring harm 
to the innocent human being who 
Catholic ethical teaching believes 
to be present. Here it is not just 
a question of providing the per-
son with the opportunity to act in 
accord with the personal decision 
that has been reached, but there 
is the added factor of the inno-
cent human life. Thus I believe a 
distinction can and should be 
made between cooperation in 
cases of sterilization on the part 
of the Catholic hospital and co-
operation in cases of abortion. 
The argument can also be made 
from the ethical perspective that 
society should always respect the 
conscience of the individuai when 
it comes to a matter of taking hu-
man life. In many ways it has 
been one of the principal reasons 
proposed by those, including the 
American bishops, who have ar-
gued in the United States for the 
existence of selective conscien-
tious objection to participation in 
warY It is admitted that in a 
pluralistic society there are bound 
to be conflicts of beliefs and of 
rights but society also recognizes 
that the most important value we 
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have is the value of human life. 
To uphold the belief of those who 
do not want to participate in 
what they believe to be the wrong 
killing of human life is one very 
important way in which society 
can promote the sanctity and dig-
nity of human life. In this regard 
it seems that the action of the Su-
preme Court in the Georgia case 
asserting the right of conscien-
tious exemption in the matter of 
abortion is in accord with the 
best ethical understanding of so-
ciety and the role of government 
in society. 
One must also raise here the 
fact that even on the matter of 
abortion there can be dissent 
within the Roman Catholic 
Church. As a matter of fact, there 
is some dissent on abortion but 
less than in the matter of sterili-
zation. 38 However, because of the 
nature of what is involved I be-
lieve even those who dissent 
should be willing to uphold the 
right of the majority of Roman 
Catholics at the present time to 
give this communal witness in our 
society. 
This article has attempted to 
revise the theoretical understand-
ing of cooperation in evil in the 
light of the teaching proposed in 
the Declaration on Religious Free-
dom. 39 By accepting both a quali-
fied right of the individual to act 
in accord with the dictates of his 
conscience and the limitations 
which can be placed on that right 
a different concept of cooperation 
has been proposed and applied to 
the cooperation of doctors and 
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Catholic hospitals in the ques-
tions of sterilization and of ab-
ortion. 
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